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A new Illinois appellate case, Kaipust v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., 2025 IL App (1st) 240530-U, has analyzed whether Illinois state law tort claims against freight brokers can proceed or whether they are pre-empted by federal law.
Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, (Hereinafter “FAAAA”), to preempt state trucking regulations that had become burdensome on interstate commerce and free trade, and to avoid the “patchwork” of state laws, rules, and regulations that made interstate commercial transportation inefficient, resulting in increased costs to consumers. 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1). The FAAAA broadly preempts any “[state] law, regulation, or other provision” that is “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier … or … broker.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The FAAAA also contains a “safety exception,” which provides that the FAAAA does not restrict the “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A).
Because of the preemption of state laws related to broker services, attorneys for brokers named as defendants in litigation have sought to have those lawsuits dismissed. As these cases have worked their way through state and federal courts, a split in federal districts has emerged.
The 7th [Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023)] and 11th Circuits [Aspen Am. Ins. v. Landstar Ranger, 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023)] have determined that the Safety Exception does not operate to save plaintiffs’ claims against brokers; the 9th Circuit has ruled that it does [Miller v. CH Robinson, Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020)].
No Illinois state court had yet ruled on the issue until Kaipust v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., 2025 IL App (1st) 240530-U. (In Illinois, an unpublished opinion is not controlling, but rather persuasive authority for a court to consider so long as counsel provides a copy of it to the judge and other attorneys.)
In Kaipust, the matter was before the Court on a certified question review. The two questions before the Court were:
1. “Does the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1), pre-empt claims for negligent hiring/selection against a broker in a common-law personal injury suit?”
2. “If the answer to [1] is in the affirmative, does the ‘safety exception’ in 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2) apply to negligent hiring/selection claims against a broker in a common-law personal injury suit?”
The court recognized that these questions were ones of first impression in Illinois and ruled (1) the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (49 U.S.C. § 14501 (2024)) preempts negligent selection claims against trucking brokers, but (2) the statutory safety exception saves negligent selection claims from preemption.
Given the preemption clause’s plain and ordinary meaning, the primary “service” a trucking broker provides is the selection of a trucking company to transport the load at issue. Thus, claims based on how the broker performed that task are necessarily “related to” the “service” of a trucking broker. Ye, 74 F. 4th at 459 (citing Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, 552 U.S 364, 370 (2008)).
The Kaipust court found that the language of the FAAAA is not clear on the issue of whether the safety exception applies to negligent selection claims against a trucking broker. (Kaipust, Paragraph 32.) Thus, the court could utilize the tools of statutory construction. Id. Courts must interpret express preemption clauses subject to the maxim that a court will not find a federal law preempts a state’s ability to provide for public safety absent a clear statutory directive from Congress. Id. at paragraph 33; See Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1996).
The court then reasoned that it would be “highly unlikely” that Congress would intend to permit brokers to act as negligently as they wanted to without remedy for any injured party. Id. at paragraph 34. The court considered a scenario where a broker selects a motor carrier who gets in an accident every time it is selected and questioned whether an injured party should have the ability to seek redress from the broker. Id. “It would also be an absurd result to interpret the intent of Congress to allow brokers to act as negligently as they want with impunity, and courts will not engage in such interpretations.” Id. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982).
The court rejected the Ye and Aspen Courts’ reasoning that negligent selection claims were “too attenuated” to be considered to fall within the Safety Exception language of “with respect to motor vehicles” as they did not have a direct effect on motor vehicles. Id. at paragraph 36. “Negligent selection claims are sufficiently responsive to safety concerns . . . they are directly responsible for the presence of a truck on a road within the state.” Id. at 37.
While many defense counsel, brokers, and insurance companies hoped that Ye and Aspen would guide Illinois Courts’ rulings, Kaipust took a different approach. The resulting division among circuits deepened an already complicated arena for broker liability claims.
However, this ongoing uncertainty may soon be resolved. On October 3, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al.—a case arising out of the Seventh Circuit that squarely addresses whether negligent hiring claims against freight brokers are preempted under the FAAAA. The Court’s forthcoming decision is expected to provide much-needed clarity and, potentially, a uniform national standard for how the FAAAA’s safety exception applies to broker liability.
After years of conflicting interpretations, it seems the issue is finally on the path toward resolution.
